

San Diego Fire-Rescue Department

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Fire Chief



Setting the Record Straight

- ▶ Fire Station 40 is not closed nor proposed for closure
 - No City fire station is closed nor proposed for closure
- ▶ Trucks 40, 44 and 46 (Quints) have firefighting capability
 - same capacity pump, but less water and hose
- ▶ Fire Station 46 (Santa Luz) was never considered for participation in brown-outs since it is not a multi-unit station
 - was considered and ruled out as alternate home for HazMat crew
- ▶ Fire Chief is responsible for development of brown-out plan
 - Mayor/COO/Council were informed and are being kept apprised
- ▶ All cuts, including public safety, are due to revenue shortfall



Topics for Discussion

- Overview of Department
- How do brown-outs work?
- Why brown-outs vs. other cuts?
- How were these stations chosen?
- Why brown-out engines vs. trucks?
- What are the impacts of brown-outs?
- Can any brown-out units be restored?
- Can anything be done to improve coverage?
- Questions?



Overview


San Diego Fire-Rescue Department

- 331 Square Miles
- 1,337,000 People
- 850 Firefighters
- 47 Fire Stations
- ~~\$199,911,076~~ Budget
- \$187,437,617



Fire Service Deployment Model

- Fire-Rescue mission has changed in last 30 years
 - 82% of calls are medical
 - 3½% of calls are fires
 - Remainder are: rescue/special service
- “All-Risk” capability to respond to all non-law enforcement incidents
 - Local crew can handle wide range of incidents
 - Efficient; less costly than specialized crews
 - Fire/medical services = insurance policy



How do brown-outs work?

- From one to eight *fire engines* in the 13 stations with more than one apparatus will be subject to brown-out each day
 - Will now be like 34 other stations with only one unit
 - Coverage continually monitored and adjusted as needed
- Firefighters displaced from these engines will work in place of other firefighters who are on vacation, sick leave, etc.
- This pool of available replacements will eliminate the need to bring firefighters in on overtime



Brown-outs

- \$11,500,000 budget savings by reducing overtime



Why brown-outs vs. other cuts?

- ▶ Brown-outs were the best of several unattractive options available to achieve necessary savings
 - Fire-Rescue consumes 17% of General Fund
 - Greatest area of expense is fire station staffing costs
 - Elimination of other services could not achieve savings
- ▶ Alternatives to achieve savings in Fire-Rescue
 - Permanent closure of fire stations/units or lifeguard towers
 - Lay-off of firefighters and lifeguards
- ▶ Alternatives would have had greater public safety consequences and cause greater long-term damage to the provision of emergency services



Fire Station Brown-outs and Closures

- California
 - Gilroy
 - Lodi
 - Los Angeles
 - Sacramento
 - Santa Rosa
- Major Cities
 - Atlanta
 - Baltimore
 - Cincinnati
 - Detroit
 - New York
 - Philadelphia



How were brown-out stations chosen?

▶ 47 Fire Stations

- 34 house one engine
- 11 house one engine and one truck
- 1 houses two engines and one truck
- 1 houses one engine and one heavy rescue unit

▶ Why not brown-out an engine in a single-unit station?

- Total loss of emergency response resources in community
- Greatly increased response times from adjacent communities
- Security issues with vacated fire station

▶ Why brown-out a unit from a multi-unit fire station?

- Emergency response capability maintained in community
- Far less impact on response times than closure



How did you rank the priorities for brown-out?

- ▶ Average number of emergency responses over 3 year period
 - Engine 40 = 1184 responses Engine 44 = 1498 responses
 - Others = 2138 - 3650 responses
- ▶ Response time differential for 2nd due unit
- ▶ Availability of surrounding units to provide coverage
- ▶ Special activities conducted in the fire stations
 - Station 44 - HazMat (unit is cross-staffed by truck crew)
 - Station 4 - Heavy Rescue (only resource in City)
 - Station 10 - Probationary FF and Field Training (daily)
- ▶ Avoidance of adjacent district brown-outs
 - Unable to avoid E40/E44 and E11/E14 conflicts



Eight Unit Rolling Brown-out Plan

A Group	A Group Re-staff Priority	A Group Point Score		B Group	B Group Re-Staff Priority	B Group Point Score
E44 Mira Mesa	8	90		E44 Mira Mesa	8	90
E40 Rancho Penasquitos	7	90		E40 Rancho Penasquitos	7	90
E10 College/SDSU	6	75		E10 College/SDSU	6	75
E11 Golden Hill	5	80		E201 Downtown	5	80
E20 Midway	4	80		E21 Pacific Beach	4	75
E14 North Park	3	75		E29 San Ysidro	3	75
E28 Kearny Mesa	2	70		E35 University City	2	75
E4 Downtown	1	70		E12 Lincoln Park	1	60



Why brown-out engines vs. trucks?

- A fire **truck** is not a fire **engine**



Fire Engine (fights fires)







Fire Truck (large tool box/no water)



Quint Fire Trucks at Sta. 40, 44, 46 (smaller tool box/fights fires)



Engine Districts and Truck Districts



Which unit type to brown-out?



Engines Make the Most Sense



Brown-outs: Impacts

- 13% Fewer fire units results in increased response times
 - Fires = Increased fire spread/damage
 - EMS = Prolonged pain/anxiety
 - Sometimes greater injury and death
- Remaining units will be busier
 - Ripple effect
 - Less time for training, inspections and maintenance
 - Delays in staffing brush apparatus
- Increased wear and tear and down time on trucks



Brown-out Impacts on Response Times

- ▶ Out-of Service Time for Participating Engines
 - All = 21.27% - 99.25% Truck 40 = 99.25%
- ▶ Compliance with 90% 5 min. First Unit Arrival Response Time
 - City-Wide Same Period Last Year = 55%
 - City-Wide During Brown-Outs = 53.22%
 - Rancho Penasquitos Same Period Last Year= 29.88%
 - Rancho Penasquitos During Brown-Outs = 17.58%
- ▶ Average Response Times (minutes/seconds)
 - City-Wide Same Period Last Year = 5:03
 - City-Wide During Brown-Outs = 5:10
 - Rancho Penasquitos Same Period Last Year= 5:58
 - Rancho Penasquitos During Brown-Outs = 6:42



Effective Fire Force (EFF)

- ▶ Defined as the number of firefighters required to perform operations at a typical single-family dwelling fire (14-15 FFs)
 - SDFD achieves this with 3 engines, 1 truck and 1 BC
- ▶ Compliance with 90% 9 min. EFF Response Time
 - City-Wide Same Period Last Year = 84.69%
 - City-Wide During Brown-Outs = 80.26%
 - Rancho Penasquitos Same Period Last Year= 100% (1 fire)
 - Rancho Penasquitos During Brown-Outs = 0% (2 fires)
- ▶ Average Effective Fire Force Response Times
 - City-Wide Same Period Last Year = 6.64 minutes
 - City-Wide During Brown-Outs = 7.86 minutes
 - Rancho Penasquitos Same Period Last Year= 8.47 minutes
 - Rancho Penasquitos During Brown-Outs = 10.22 minutes



Can brown-out units be restored?

- ▶ Not without additional revenues
- ▶ \$1.4M annual savings for each brown-out unit
- ▶ Savings needed to maintain balanced City budget
- ▶ No additional revenue in Dept/City budget to restore browned-out units or other cuts
- ▶ Lack of revenue due to prolonged worldwide recession and decrease in City revenues



Can anything be done to improve coverage?

- ▶ Fire Chief has the authority to temporarily re-staff browned-out units
- ▶ Weather conditions, operational workloads and special event impacts are continually monitored and adjustments to daily brown-outs are made when needed
- ▶ Re-staffing was necessary to provide coverage for:
 - Mardi Gras on February 16 (1 unit re-staffed)
 - Floatopia on March 20-21 (1 unit re-staffed)
 - Earthquake on April 4 (2 units re-staffed)



What possibilities are being examined to improve upon the existing B/O Plan?

- ▶ Reassign Quints to ensure extinguishment capability
- ▶ Change brown-out unit type to ensure extinguishment capability
- ▶ Re-arrange units in brown-out groups
- ▶ Relocate trucks to better coverage location and then brown-out a unit in that station
- ▶ Change location of brush apparatus to speed staffing



